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by 
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I. A PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF ONE PHIWSOPHER'S PHIWSO­
PHICAL POINT OF VIEW 
In my own philosophical writings, I have found it useful on many occasions 
to defend logically weak ttheses. As I conceive this principle, a thesis is tolerably 
weak only if one can hold to it without doing violence to other principles in the 
fields in question. The main reason for adhering to such a precept, for it is only 
that, is in order to help us to ensure that mood of unstudied calm which is 
perhaps merely another way of referring to wisdom. As will be seen, I am 
somewhat old fashioned; I still believe that the business of philosophy is the 
pursuit of wisdom, though what wisdom amounts to is a philosophical problem 
of the first order. Why should one seek any form of wisdom? What good does it 
do? Well, for philosophical, as well as for other human purposes, it leaves us free 
to reflect upon our human problems without falling asleep: one cannot think 
straight about anything, if one is subject to what David Hume l:alled the violent 
passions. Such, a principle of weakness, as 1 shall henceforth call it, should, of 
courset be .weakly held. There are exceptions to every rule , and this is one of 
them. 
The main point for stressing tlie principle of weakness at the outset is plain : it 
helps to save truth and labor. Why? Only, 1 think, because it disposes .us to avoid 
definitive, hard, strong rules or principles, in tenns of which others have tried, 
usually without sucess, to formulate the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
some ideal, form of thought, discourse, action, or life, which at any given time, 
they may have in view. Strongly, and hence violently held, any point of view is 
bound to appear absolute .. And with William James, I say "Damn the absolute!" 
A word of caution is now in order. In this essay," I shall try to abide by the 
principle of weakness in the following examination of what some philosophers 
have called "the moral point of view", and in what many others have called "the 
principle, or principles, of morals". I shall claim that the concept of morals, or 
morality, is not a completely open one. A completely open concept, in my view, 
doesn't make sense. For a completely open concept would be indistinguishable 
from any other concept whatever. A completely open concept, in fact, is no 
concept at all. In many cases, and particularly in the case of morality, necessary 
conditions can and must be found. We come in sight of them when we find that 
a statement, including above all, a statement of principle appears, as we ponder 
it more closely , not simply false, but paradoxical. Thus most of us, I should 
hope, would want to say, after only a moment's hesitation, that it is false that, 
despite Kant, honesty is always the best policy. Generally speaking, most 
reasonable moral agents have learned, sometimes by bitter experience, that 
honesty is usually the best policy, or else a very good policy, even though it may 
be necessary on occasion to tell lies. Were someone to say that adultery is always 
the best policy, we would have to say "no". Sometimes adultery is justifiable, as 
all but absolutists in morals or religion will, at this late date, usually admit. As 
Aristotle puts it, moral prihciples are true "only for. the most part". 
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In this essay, I argue against the widespread view, still as popular among 
philosophers as it has been in the past, that there is, or should be, one and only 
one thing that answers to the phrase "the moral point of view". Accordingly , I 
contend that there is no closed set of principle of morals and that morality is not 
a wholly distinguishable institution or discipline. Or, which comes to the same 
thing, I shall contend that "the moral point of view" is, in practice, an empty 
phrase. 
This I assert from a logical point of view. (It is worth noting, in passing, that 
Quine calls his early volume of papers "From a Logical Point of View", and not 
"From the Logical Point of View".) And I imagine that from what I know of his 
later writings, he would question the viability of something called "the logical 
point of view". But, of course, there is more to it than that. For, from a moral 
or from . osychological point of view, I hope to show that those who seriously 
commit themselves to the doctrine of "the moral point of view", become 
incapacitated for every-day moral deliberations, decisions and choices. Toward 
the close
. 
of this essay, I shall argue, in fact, that those who take � moral ooint 
of view earnestly fall ineluctably into skepticism. Indeed, they become involved 
in effect, in a kind of hermeneutic circle. They hope by interpretation to bring 
us back to a better understanding of true religion and true morality. But as they 
continually pursue their interpretations, ahd pile them up, one upon the other, 
they lead themselves farther and farther away from practical moral relfections 
and decisions. We must break the circle. Analysis and . interpretation are 
unavoidable. But we are also men and women of affairs, and we have other 
things to dlo in the world save endlessly pursue our philosophical investigations. 
In short, it is not the part of wisdom to think too much about it. 
II. SOME VIEWS OF MORALITY NOT ADVANCED IN THIS ESSAY 
Before attempting to show why the so-called moral point of view cannot be 
sustained, let me now indicate summarily, and without argument, some attitudes 
toward moral activities of all sorts with which I have no sympathy. It is e.ssential 
to specify a few of them before proceeding. The reason is that exponents of "the 
moral point of view" commonly argue that its abandonment necessarily commits 
its adversaries to some form of ethical relativism, skepticism or, more ultimately, 
nihilism. I have no very apt label for the point of which I defend. Perhaps the 
following phrase may suggest the drift of the point of view toward morals, and 
other subjects, which I wish to defend. Construed narrowly, the point of view I 
have in mind may be called, in ethics and elsewhere, "pluralistic objectivism". 
Let me now say something about some of the theses in philosophy for which. 
I am not arguing. 
First of all, I am not suggesting that there are no moral principles. Secondly, I 
am not even denying that there are principles of morals, or better, moral 
principles. I am denying only that such principles constitute something called 
"the principles of morals". Thirdly, I am not suggesting either that morality is 
non-cognitive or that moral principles and judgments are merely emotive. In my 
view, all genuine moral discourse, including moral principles, is corrigible, and 
hence cognitive. Later I shall argue that, as a matter of principle, corrigibility is 
merely the other side of the coin of cognitivity, in ethics and elsewhere. 
Absolute incorrigibility, in my view, is merely a form of irrationality. Fourthly, 
in speaking of rationality I mean nothing more than reasonableness. For my 
part, a reasonable person is a rational one. ·Nowhere do l hold that all, or most, 
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well-tested moral principles are without justification. On this score, my position 
is weak: our moral principles, by and large, should be r.egarded as innocent until 
proved guilty, but of course, when they are held in good faith by ordinary 
persons of good will. Fifthly, I am not defending any form of moral 
complacency . Common sense, in morality , as elsewhere, is not a kind of 
anti-philosophical poor man's divinity. So I am not representing the widespread 
view that it is not worthwhile to study morality and the principles and ideals 
pertaining to it. Nor am I suggesting that moral philosophy is a mistake or based 
upon a mistake as Prichard is sometimes taken to be saying. After all, Prichard 
was doing moral philosophy, and doing it extremely well, in his famous essay "Is 
Moral Philosophy Based Upon a Mistake?" Without the help of better, though 
always corrigible, moral reflection, moral theory is helpless before the 
extravagant claims of those who extol "the moral point of view". 
III. SOME MAIN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY VERSIONS OF THE 
MORAL POINT OF VIEW 
The reader will doubtless want to know in advance some of the main moral 
theories which I oppose in this paper. For purposes of orientation, therefore, tlfo 
following list may be of use. 
The main classical forms of the doctrine in question derive historically from 
the Stoic doctrine of natural law. The influence of Stoicism is evident, I think, in 
such works as St. Thomas Aquinas' Treatise on Law, in Locke's Second Treatise 
on Civil Government, and in our owri Declaration of Independence. Most 
notably, however, what is now called "the moral point of view" is to be found in 
an extreme form in the ethics of Kant. 
Among the great moral philo.c;ophies of more recent times, utilitarianism, 
particularly in its Benthamite formulation, clearly represents, in the so-called 
Principle of Utility, a version of "the moral point of view". In fact, Bentham 
holds the principle of utility to be the one and only supreme governing principle 
of morals, and in this respect, if in no other, his position is precisely the same as 
Kant's. 
Among contemporary representatives of the doctrine, it was Kurt Baier, of 
course, who gave the doctrine its name in his book, The Moral Point of View. 
Let me praise Baier's work here, for its clarity and sweep, even though I don't 
discuss it much in these pages. In my view, by all odds the most important,  the 
subtlest, and the most stimulating of all contemporary writers who have 
defended the moral point of view is William Frankena. 
Here l shall not include the two major moral intuitionists, Ross and Prichard, 
since as I read them, they not only do not subscribe to the moral point of view, 
but both of them, in fact ,  and on principle, oppose it. More recently, John 
Rawls is undoubtedly the most famous advocate of a version of the doctrine in 
his work A Theory of Justice. It should be added that most, although not all, of 
Rawls' critics also take the moral point of view. So far as I can see they differ 
from him only in regard to the principle(s) of justice which they take to be 
basic. So the disputes between them and Rawls, so far as this essay is concerned, 
may be regarded largely as a closet quarrel . 
In the rest of this paper I shall devote my own attention primarily to William 
Frankena, my old friend and most friendly philosophical adversary. 
It is now time that something .should b� said about my own predecessors. 
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Among classic moral philosophers which have opposed the point of view in 
question, the greatest of all, to my mind, is David Hume. Throughout my whole 
philosophical career, Hume has been my own exemplum of what a moral 
philosopher should strive to be. I wrote my own Ph.D. dissertation on Hume's 
moral ·and political philosophy, the other on his Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion. The second introduction is brief, but it shows my own sense of the 
originality of Hume's second greatest work. But it is in Book III of A Treatise of 
Human Nature that his enormous power as a moral philosopher is developed in 
extenso. 
In our own time, probably the most distinguished AJ:nerican opponent of the 
moral point of view is C. L. Stevenson, to whose memory this essay is dedicated. 
I shall say little here about Stevenson's so-called "'emotive theory" of ethics, 
though it should b e  remembered that he himself came to reject the theory of 
emotive meaning as it applies to ethics. 
In my view, three earlier American philosophers have also defended what I 
have called "objective pluralism". These are William James, Geor.ge Santayana 
and Jolm Dewey. The latter, be it noted, greatly influenced Stevenson . All of 
them have a good deal in common with Hume's common sense liberalism; and 
one can find it running in various ways through their writings. 
Not surprisingly , a good deal of support for my approach to the philosophical 
problems of morals may be found in writings of the English intuitionists, both 
early and late. Here, three powerful contributors to the tradition of intuitionism 
deserve mention . 
The first, of course, is G. E. Moore. Moore, who gave "the naturalistic 
fallacy" its name, was perhaps the first moral philosopher in recent times to see 
why there can be no such thing as the one and only set of principles of morals. 
And it was Moore who first used, explicitly, the so-calted open question 
argument in showing the errors inherent, not only in empiricist versions of 
ethical naturalism, including Benthamite utilitarianism, but also those associated 
with Kantian formalistic rationalism and with metaphysical ethical theories 
which identify "goodness" with "being" or "reality". Moore's fundamental 
mistake, as Prichard has shown ,. consisted in his assumption that the 
fundamental ethical term is "good", and that such other terms as "right" and 
"ought" are definable in relation to, or else in. terms of it. As everyone knows, 
Moore regards "good" and "ought to be" as synonyms. He holds, also, that 
"right acti.on" can be defined , without loss of meaning, as "action conducive to 
the greatest good". He takes the same view of any action of which it may be said 
that it "ought to be performed". What Moore failed to see is that the open 
question may significantly be raised with respect to any proposition of any 
action which is, or is believed to be, conductive to something called "the greatest 
good''. Let us suppose that it would be to the greatest good, whether in the long 
run ,  or in the foreseeabfo future that Henry Aiken should stop writing essays 
against the moral point o f  view. Nevertheless:, r.egardless of one's criterion for 
judging what is good, it still may be asked, ·a s I myself have repeatedly done, 
"But after all, and upon sober second thought, isn't it quite possible that Henry 
Aiken ought still to continue writing moral philosophy "? What principles of 
morals absolutely forbid it? Not justice, surely. Benevolence then? General 
utility? The answers to these questions remain unclear. And they remain so at 
both ends� the principles themselves are too loose and too many to make it in 
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the least certain which applies most securely to this particular case or situation. 
Moreover, the case itself involves many uncertainties, not at the fringes only, but 
at the center. Who is Henry Aiken, what is he, here and now? Questions upon 
questions multiply in such profusion that one is tempted to flip a coin, which, it 
must be confessed, has its virtue in circumstances where a decision on such a 
basis, for such a reason , if no other principle, or rule, obtrudes.itself decisively. 
More to the point is the possibility that I simply ought to go on making the 
effort to refute the doctrine of "the morat" point of view", come hell or high 
water; because, so to say, it is the most important thing in the circumstances for 
.me to. do. And, I am bound to add, much the same would hol'd, were Frankena 
or some other exponent of "the moral point of view", to ask himself whether he 
ought to get on with his own philosophical job of work. 
The line I am taking strikes me as characteristic of Prichard. He does not, of 
course, deny that we should abandon moral principles as action guides, though 
this reading of the essay has sometimes occurred to other readers. What he does 
say is that no such principle, or group of principles, ever provide air-tight reasons 
for doing this thing, or performing this action rather than that. One can ask, if 
one is so minded, "But ought I to do this -- ?" And one can always answer 
"Yes" (or "No") even when one can find no compelling reason whatever for 
doing or not doing it: "The sense of obligation . .  .is absolutely underivative or 
immediate." (Prichard, M. 0. p.7). More clearly, "the sense of obligation to do 
this thing is immediate": It comes when it comes, not with perfect assurance , no 
doubt, but at any rate with sufficient assurance . To employ Prichard 's own 
word, we "appreciate" that this T; the right thing to do, the thing we ought to 
do. Or, to employ another word, which I borrow from Aristotle (and Kant), we 
judge that we ought to do this thing or that. You may say, if you like, that in so 
doing we are erecting judgmen! into a principle. Very well. But then the 
principle of judgment is nothing else than the principle which permits, or 
requires that, having given as mucli time as we can afford, we simply do what 
our own consciences tell us to do. 
I have not the space here to examine in any detail Prichard ts discussion of the 
"two preliminaries" which "may be necessary" in deciding what we ought to do, 
here and now. Reasonably enough, Prichard points out that we may have to 
consider more fully than we have done hitherto, the probable consequences of a 
proposed action, or line of action. And of course, we have also to bring into play 
our sense of those moral' rules, or principles, which have, or appear to have, a 
bearing upon the case at hand. Thus, for example, if someone has done us a 
kindness, not entirely out of a .desire to please, but also from a sense of what 
moral sentiment re.quires, then, in my book, we owe him or her a corresponding 
· debt of gratitude, which we are bound to discharge, other things being equal, in 
an appropriate situation. And, if the situation J! appropriate, we should, to say 
the least, offer him or her O\U thanks and good wishes . This is not a mere matter 
of common courtesy, though courtesy has its moral implications: it is a matter 
of obligation . We ought, again, other things being equal, and so we are obliged to 
consider whether we should show him our gratitude. In short, as Prichard would 
admit, or say, we may have to decide whether what we should do here and now 
is to be decided solely in virtue or our relationship t.o the individual in question 
or whether some other factor in the situation requires that something else be 
done or not done. What would that something else be? We do not have to put a. 
name on it, and perhaps we are unable to find an appropriate name, and, hence, 
a corresponding moral rule of principle. 
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Moral diversity, then, is a fact of life. It cannot be gainsaid by talk about "the 
moral point of view", "the principles of morals'', or what, ideally, we ought to 
accept as the "whole duty of man". 
Let me emphasize, at once, that I take no satisfaction in recognizing that 
ultimate, or penultimate, moral disagreements about matters of principle exist, 
which play hob with the philosophical doctrine of the moral point. of view. My 
main point here is much the same as Prichard's and, now let me add, that of Sir 
David Ross, wh'O is the other great intuitionist I wish to enlist as an ally in my 
crusade against the doctrine that there is a definitive, closed set of basic moral 
principles, binding, once and for all, upon every moral human being whatever. 
Ross is more famous than Prichard as an intuitionist of what may be called "the 
Oxford School" of the first third of the present· century. Nevertheless, his 
account of what he calls ''.wima facie duties" (and rights) is a, permanent 
contribution to the progress of moral philosophy. What is so impressive about 
these great ethicists is that, unlike Moore, they are completely free of the 
objectionable epistemological and metaphysical fairy .tales which afflicted 
Moore. They make it quite clear that so-called intuitionism is not an out!Jloded 
form of moral theorizing but, on the contrary, one permanent and natural way 
of telling what needs to be said about the moral life as experienced by ordinary 
persons. Hume, no doubt about it, is a greater philosopher than Ross and 
· Prichard. And so is William James. But ·they can ·be assimilated into the 
philosophical traditions of Hume and James, and let me add, Santayana. It is in 
that tradition that this monograph belongs. - ' 
Before closing this indispensible section on positions which I shall be 
opposing in the section that follows, let me now go back to Frankena and 
explain a bit more fully why I choose him as my principle adversary in this 
essay. My reasons are essentially three: Frankena's classic early essay, 
"The Naturalistic Fallacy''. is without doubt the strongest attack upon 
if and the open question argument in existence. Since first reading it, I have 
known, beyond peradventure, who my principle. adversary would be and having 
reread it recently, for the tenfh time, I am sure of the truth of this claim as I was 
at the time. Bluntly, this monograph would never have been undertaken, or even 
conceived, without Frankena's paper. It is a pearl of great price, as rriore recent 
�xponents of the doctrines ranged here under the heading of "the moral point of 
view" well know. Secondly, and for re.asons wl).ich, even now, I only partly 
understand, Frankena seems to have instinc�.ively r.
ecognized my own 
philosophical writings, and perhaps my conversations with him oyer the years, as 
one of .h!l primary goads, and guide , in his never-ending battle against my 
"pluralistilc objectivism ": Any close reading of his book Perspective in Moral 
Philosophy will bear me out. But I think my friend will not object if I add that 
he himself has said as much· to me more than once in our many discussions of 
the problems of ethics over several decad�s. fie has also said the �arrie thing, 
more than once, in our correspondence. Just the other day, I (eceived a letter 
from him in which he said, in effect, that very often he has felt my philosophical 
eye upon him as he has composed some of his more re�ent articles and 
monographs, including above all, the splendid essay "The Principles of Morals", 
which, along with "The Naturalistic FaUacy'', supplies the basic t�xt for my own 
thinking throughout this piece. There remains a third, "arid more important 
reason for choosing Frankena�s work as my prima,y text. Although he· has done 
his best work hitherto in. his essays, and though· he is, like myself, as essayist to 
. . . . . . 
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the manor born, Frankena is a systematic thinker, and there can be no doubt 
that, even without his Carns Lectures, his collected essays explain his account of 
what the so-called moral point of view really is. It exists, and so far as I know, 
there is nothing in the contemporary literature in defense of the moral point of 
view to compare to it . 
IV. THE MAIN CONTENTIONS OF !l;,IE MORAL POINT.OF VIEW AS RE­
PRESENTED BY WILLIAM FRANKENA 
There are two fundamental ways of thinking about morality and moralities 
Frankena tells us. One is the "sociological" (or, as I like to say "out house") 
way. The other is the "moral", "ethical" (or, again as I would put it "in house") 
way. In the former case, we may speak unproblematically about "the morality 
of the Chinese", "ancient morality", or more simply "a moral code". (These are 
Frankena's examples.) In the latter case, we are not simply asserting something 
about someone's (or group's) moral code but, on the contrary, we are asserting 
(or applying) . propositions from some point of view which we take to be 
representative of "the moral law'', "the princip,les of morality", ''what morality. 
requires", or more simply, "true morality". (Again , these are Fr.ankena's 
examples.) 
Frankena and I are concerned primarily about the latter. To put it in �mother 
way, we are concerned only about those who represent the point of view in 
question, those, that is to say, who "belong,,. . 
It may be added· here, for purposes of clarification, that the "sociological" 
way of thinking about morality,  or morals, is usually considered "inactive". That 
is to say, it carries with it no ·moral' commitments of any sort, pro O f  con. It is 
inactive in ·the same way that statements about other people's manners of dre�, 
ways of building their houses, and so on, are so. Thus, if I should say that the 
Chinese usually build houses with flat roofs, 1 would be speaking, not morally , 
but sociologically and hence inactively. But if I should say that the morally good 
per-son follows the principle of utility (in one of its interpretations) in making 
his or her moral judgments, I' would be speaking morally and hence actively . 
In order to -clarify what is meant by Frankena and myself in speaking of 
active moral judgments or statements, I shall introduce his useful term "action 
guide ". Now, to be sure, there are some who have not supposed that moral 
judgments or statements, including statements of principle, such as the principle 
of utility, are intentionally, or formally, to be regarded as action guides. 
Following Moore, they have commonly been regarded as "naturalists". Examples 
that come readily to mind are Ralph Barton Perry and, somewhat more 
problematically , John Dewey. Perry explicitly, and Dewey less clearly and 
consistently, have usually contended that moral, or ethical, or "value" 
judgments are simply statemen�s of fact, in the same way that the statement that 
sqme people ar11 cross.eyed are so. In their view , �  Perry used to put it, we take 
value judgments .seriously only because we are interested in values. So the 
connection in this view is purely "psychological". And Dewey, on occasion, has 
said precisely the same thing though, as .usual, his remarks are le� easy to 
interpret. But it is not only the so-called naturalists who have stated or implied. 
that ethical judgments are inactive. The same is true of such intuitionists· as 
Moore. When Moore asserted that the contemplation of beautiful objects or acts 
of kindness are intrinsically good, he contended that such acts or rather, 
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statements about them, are merely factual, and hence not to be taken, logically, 
as action guides. Many others have also taken the same view of the m�tter. 
However, despite appearances to the contrary , most of the greatest 
philosophers, past and present, have regarded moral judgments, including 
judgments of principle, as necessarily (or logically) action guides and they have 
generally assumed, or argued, that when we assert, for example, that happiness is 
the only thing that is good for its own sake, we are thereby committing oUFs�lves 
to the pursuit of happiness. Afjstotle is.an important case in point. Hume, quite 
plainly, is another and the same is true of Kant and, despite Moore, J .  S. Mill. 
Here qualification must be made. This will be seen to be of great importance 
later on. Hume, for example, has often, although as I have argued many times, 
mistakenly been taken to be an emotivist, in the same way that A. J. Ayer and 
C. L. Stevenson have been taken to be, or have themselves asserted that they are 
emotivists. The issue between Frankena and myself does not concern emotivism 
and the emotivists. Neither of us has ever regarded himself as an emotivist, or 
regarded the other as an emotivist. In my .case, despite my everlasting arguments 
in paper after paper, against emotivism, including Stevenson's own earlier version 
of the emotive theory, he himself,. in a review of my book.Reason and Conduct, 
gave it a rather flattering compliment. Why? Because in his view, and despite my 
protestations, I was an emotivist of sorts. Some, though not many have regarded 
my views as, in some sense, ''non-cognitivist". Why? Only, I think, because I 
have always regarded moral judgments as guides to action rather than as 
straight-forward factual statements. Frankena, however, has never been thought 
of as an emotivist, though his new talk about action guides might have disposed 
Stevenson to regard even him as an emotivist ! So let us drop the question of 
emotivism, and the question whether Frankena and I are, or are not, emotivists, 
for the time being. 
· 
We now come to 'the central topic. Frankena contends not only that there are 
necessary principles of morals, but also that there is one single set of them which 
is both necessary and sufficient. I do not. In my view there are indeed moral 
principles. I have called them, in Reason and Conduct, "preceptive principles". 
And I am now prepared to admit that within a certain group such principles may 
be so ingrained, and so "common-sensical" that they are regarded as the 
principles of morals ·· but only for that group, whether its members know it or 
not. They are preceptive , ,in my opinion, because they are neither constitutive 
nor, finally, strictly institutional rules, necessary to the identity of the 
institution -- in this case the so-called institutidn of ·�morality". But this takes us 
right back to the beginning. And there is no need, at this stage, to do this. So the 
issue between Frankena and me is now fairly clearly joined. 
In passing, it is worthwhile to say something about the question whether the 
issue between Frankena and me is an ontological or metaphysical issue, or 
merely a "logicat" or "linguistic" one. I am prepared to take it both ways. 
Following Wittgenstein, I do indeed believe that moral utterances are "forms of 
words". But, again following him, I also regard them without hesitation, as 
articulations of "forms of life". And the articulation of a form of life is the 
articulation of something that is real, has being; put it any way you like. The 
only point that needs reemphasis here-, is that morality, in whatever way you 
case to take- it, is that reality is not limited to any one kind of being. I am not a 
follower of Parmenides, and neither is Frankena. What I am denying, and 
Frankena is clearly asserting, is that there is anything in reality represented, or 
expressed, by the phrase "the mOfal point of view" or "the principles of 
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morals". More specifically, I am denying that there is anything at all in this. or 
any other possible world corresponding to what a Dutch dictionary quoted by 
Frankena, calls, "the totality of the norms that should govern the moral life". 
Frankena reformulates th4 definition in other terms, which need not detain us 
here, but he essentially agrees with it. 
It is, of course, a completely empty claim to assert that there are necessary 
and sufficient conditions definitive of the moral point of view, or the principles 
of morals, unless one can say precisely what they are. And so, for the time being, 
I shall waive the question, which seems to me utterly absurd , whether there is 
anything at all corresponding to the totality of norms that should govern the 
moraf life. 
More interesting, and more important, is the fact that exponents of the moral 
point of view do not themselves agree about more than a handful of such 
conditions. But they do agree, certainly, about some of them. let us consider a 
minimal list. First, of course, are the logical, or linguistic, conditions of 
consistency and generality. But these hold also, for the most part, of other 
realms of discourse and reality. So, leaving the emotivists aside, we may say 
confidently that all moral philosophers accept them as a matter of course. 
Secondly, and far more importantly, exponents of the moral point of view or, 
again, the principles of morals, insist that there are certain distinctive moral, or 
ethical, conditions of morality, which are not true or necessary of other basic 
institutions such as science, art, or religion. (Again, let me remind the reader that 
I am doubtful whether sharp distinctions of any sort can be made between these 
or any other so-called "institutions". But let that pass.) The first of these 
distinctive conditions of morality, it i� agreed, is that of Eracticability. Let us 
now consider this condition in some detail. . . 
First it must be said that the condition of practicability may be taken in two 
ways. As Kant put it, morality belongs to the domain of the practical, rather 
than merely theoretical or speculative reason. A principle is a practical principle 
to Kant, as well as for Frankena and me, because it is meant to guide action and, 
therefore, our deliberations, and our judgments on all levels. But, as Kant also 
said, "ought implies can". And this principle may be construed in several ways. 
Here, I sham assume that it means that no one can be bound by any principle (of 
morals) unless he can in conscience accept it. Here, as I pointed out in Reason 
and Conduct, Kant faces the whole question of moral autonomy which ,  be it 
said at once, is .!!Q!. obviously the same question as that of the autonomy of 
morals. The questlon of moral autonomy is the question concerning the 
autonomy of itidividual moral agents, the autonomy, that is, of fu�jJ 
consciences. The question concerning the autonomy of morals, or morality, 
returns us at once back to the question concerning the autonomy of the 
institution of morality, not to mention the autonomy of other institutions. 
Now Frankena argues, again like Kant, that if X is· a principle of morals, then 
he ought to accept it, and that he can do so, if he will. Usually this is taken to 
mean that any rat\onal person, not somehow m.orally defective, qught to accept 
it, and that he would recognize that he ought to do so .. But here we face the 
highly important question of normality, and it is hardly necessary for me here to 
point out that it is not a clear one. 
But there is still another implication of Kant's maxim, "ought implies can" 
which needs comment. 
Now if I ought to accept X, then this implies c.Iearly , that in principle , I can 
indeed adhere to it, carry it out, be guided by it, or take it as an action guide, in 
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ordinary circumstances. The point is simply this: if ought is limited by can, so 
can may be bended by ought. If I try hard enough to keep f�om bearing false 
witness, then I can do it -- at least within limits, which are not here in question. 
The point is that: the pressure of my will may modify,  or bend, the limits of 
what I can do in the circumstances. So the maxim that "ought implies can" has 
two sides, or aspects, which are not usually oJ:>served by most moral 
philosophers. And that will do, I think, for this central feature of the maxim. It 
needs only to be added that Frankena has nothing to say about it. 
Let us now tum to another principle (a second principle, by my pres,>.nt 
count) which seems innocuous to most moral philosophers, and especially those 
who take the moral point of view. In fact, all of them, to my knowledge, regard 
it as a mere corollary of the consistency principle. This is the so-called principle 
of universalizability. In the Bible, it is known as The Golden Rule. Kant's 
version, however, is the one that requires our attention here. And.it is nece�sary 
to state it, at least in its first formulation, fairly precisely. In the Grundlegurig it 
goes like this: Act in such a way that the maxim of your action may be willed to 
be a universal law of nature. In the Second Critique, however ,  it is stated much 
better: Act in such a way that the maxim of your action may be willed to be the 
principle of a universal legislation. The improvement needs little comment. We 
are talking here not of laws of nature, save in the sense in which the Stoics, 
Locke and others have ta�ked of them: that is to say, of laws, or principles, of 
morals themselves. In Locke's case, for example, the natural law which confers 
upon us the rights of life, liberty and property, are clearly not physical but 
rather moral laws. Locke himself plai11ly took it for granted that the right to life 
is a moral right, and the principle that formulates it is a moral principle. It 
governs the conduct of most persons in a state o f  nature. But it also serves as the 
basis of the contract which a group of individuals enter into in forming a 
politically organized society. So, in essence, Locke is in agre�ent with the 
formulation proposed by Kant in the Second Critique, though of course he said 
nothing, to my knowledge, about the question of universalizability at all. 
Butk the universalizability principle an essential principle of morals, inherent 
in the very conception of it? Frankena, like Kant, holds that it is. I do not. Nor 
do I care in the least whether it '  is regarded as a "formal " or merely as an 
essential ''material principle". I do not assume, beyond question, that my moral 
principles, or yours, or anyone else's are universalizable, whether formally or 
materially. I am not even sure that it would be right of me to universalize, or try 
to universalize most, or perhaps even any, of my moral principles or precepts. 
Even consistency has been spoken of, not without point by Emerson , as "The 
hobgoblin of little minds". We may try to be consistent, but it does not follow 
that we must be so. It is not even clear that we can be consistent, in all or most 
instances, even if we try. Anyway, I can think of situations in which I would be 
very reluctant to try to universalize my own precepts. Let me give an example. 
One of my precepts is this: I (or we) should act in such a way that I (or we) has 
to respect the right to habeus corpus. But I am not at all sure that I would be 
prepared to universalize 1t, certainly not without qualification. In my view, every 
sensible moral principle, or imperative, has built into it an "unless" clause, which 
says, in effect, that it should be observed �Je.rus paribus or other things equal.· 
But things are rarely equal. How can we know when they are equal save in a very 
general way? In the case of habeus corpus, there are many things to b� 
considered, and the pros and cons in most cases can be and have been argued 
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endlessly. Consider for example, Llncoln's famous (or infamous) suspension of 
that right during the first ninety days after the outbreak of the Civil War. It has 
been argued that, in the circumstances, he was justified, since there was no time 
to take up every individual case; one at a time, and that, as .we know, the wheels· 
of justice move very slowty indeed. But it has also been argued, as I myself have 
done, that the right to habeus corpus, although no sacred, is a right, not only 
within our conception of just law, but also to justice itself, morally as well as 
legally. I do not say that it may never be suspended. I say only that it should not 
be suspended as a rule. And I admit that there have been many circumstances 
when there has not been time to be too scrupulous about its observance. So, in 
brief, I am not prepared to universalize habeus corpus, however, important I 
regard it. 
It is now time to make a distinction between universalizability and 
generalizability, and I am certainly prepared to generalize. As a general rule, it 
seems to me, habeus corpus is unexceptionable. Generally speaking, I believe 
that it is wrong to trespass:, in any serious way, upon other people's property -- if 
they do not have too much of it, as some do. So I am ready to generalize. But I 
am not willing to universalize. And I must let it go at that. 
· Now we must turn to principles which are usually admitted to be substantive 
as well as formal. That is to say, they affect our conduct in very material ways. 
And it cannot be doubted that those who take the moral point of view are not 
by any means agreed among themselves about them . Consider, again, 
utilitarianism and, for present purposes, I shan't worry which one is taken .. Why? 
Well, the answer is obvious. Many philosophers, to go no further, reject 
.utilitarianism, and even utilitarians disagree radically whether the principle of 
utility is a· principle concerned with the greatest happiness or, on the contrary, 
with the least suffering. Or else •they have insisted that least suffering is not the 
same thing as least pain. Suffering, I myself believe, is far more fundamental; as a 
moral conce rn, than happiness. Happiness, despite Jefferson, is still not a right, 
even if the pursuit of it is a right. Reduce suffering strikes me as something close 
to a first moral commandment or principle. Increase happiness, not to mention 
pursue it, does not. 
Other philosophers who have rejected the principle of utility have spoken of a 
principle of universal benevolence. And that, surely, is a substantive principle. 
Nor does it matter, for our purposes, whether it be directed to the reduction of 
suffering or the increase of happiness. Probably it is directed to both. And 
Frankena, explicitly , has adopted it. However, Frankena has held that in additon 
to benevolence, there must be a principle of justice, which is different from it. 
For present purposes, it is enough to say that Frankena, both in his Ethi�s and in 
his essay on "The Principles of Morality'\ concedes that they are not the same, 
and that neither can be derived from the other. So he, and he is not alone, holds 
that there are least two basic material or substantive principles of morals. He 
goes no farther: that is to, say he holds that there are two, and only two, such 
principles. 
But, while he holds that they are consistent with one another, he does. not 
show this. It is not enough, to my mind, simply to. assert that, in principle, they 
must not conflict. He must prove, in some practical sense, that they do not. But 
he does not do this. 
let us now consider somelways of avoiding conflict between them. Well, it is 
obvious that one could do so meiely by showing that one of them, it doesn't 
matter here which, is a corollary of the other. And this Frankena does not do. 
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Nor does he think that it can be done. Other alte.matives, supplied in the first 
instance by Rawls, come to mind. Thus, following Rawls, one might seek to 
establish a certain priority principle. Or, since it comes to the same thing, one 
might seek to establish a certain principle of hierarchy between benevolence and 
justice. While Rawls himself is undoubtedly a benevolenist in some large sense of 
the term, his two basic principles, as everyone knows, ·are his so-<:alled "liberty 
principle" and his so-called "principle of difference". But we are not here 
concerned with Rawls. Our concern is with justice and benevolence as Frankena, 
and behind him perhaps, Hume, conceive them. Now Hume is of no help here. 
For although Hume, for the most part, would probably give the nod to 
benevolence, Frankena does not. So he is left with a possibility of conflict which 
he nowhere adequately resolves. 
V. SOME EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 
1 .  The Problem of Simplicity 
We have now to consider the question of simplicity as an epistemological 
principle. It has been vigorously defended by William James in "The Sentiment 
of Rationality". It has been more re.cently defended by W. V. Quine in Word and 
Object. Both philosophers regard it, not simply as a labor-saving device, although 
that fact is not without importance, but as a principle of human knowledge itself 
in all spheres, inducting science, ethics, education , law, etc. 
What can be said for this contention? Let me say at the outset that I agree 
with it .. up to a point and I believe that the above-mentioned philosophers also 
agree with it only up to a point. Other things equal, which again, they rarely are, 
the simpler theory has usually though not always, been preferred to those which 
are less simple, as regards its truth claims. Examples come readily to mind. The 
Copernican theory is preferred to the Ptolemaic on grounds of simplicity . I spare 
the reader other examples. 
2.  The Problem of Intuitionism Again 
We have next to consider the question of whether intuitions, in ethics or 
elsewhere, can ever be finally eliminated. Again, I do not think so, and I doubt 
whether, in the end, the previous authors mentioned above think so, although of 
this I am uncertain.  
Why do we prefer, if we do, simpler theories to those that are more complex? 
I should argue that, in the end, we do so intuitively. It is not written into the 
heavens that simple theories are truer than those that are more complex. In the 
end, we must resort to intuition. And that, for the present, is all that I have to 
say on that subject. 
3. The Problem of Uncertainty 
Frankena is committed, in principle, to the thesis that the moral point of 
view is, for all practical purposes anyway, certain. This is what he means in 
speal .ing of "true morality". But I am bound to say that one can scarcely believe 
this. Uncertainty about virtually anything seems clearly part of the human 
condition itself. The great merit of David Hume is his commitement, despite all 
appearances to the contrary, to fallibilism. In this, of course, William James is 
follower, though he develops his radical pluralism in somewhat different ways. 
However; if we must commit ourselves to fallibilism, realism, pluralism and the 
rest, then· pretty plainly we must also commit ourselves, in effect, to a principle 
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of uncertainty though, of course, it also is one among many. Uncertitinty enters 
into every sphere of human activity and existence. Tt enters into metaphysics, 
theory of knowledge, ethics, politics, law, whatever. 
4. The Question of Common Sense 
Here I do not mean to invoke the name of Thom!lS Reid, although he is a 
more interesting thinker that those who do not read his writings know and in 
these days, very few read Reid. Who does follow a principle o f  common sense? 
Well, I can think of a good many: Hume, Peirce, James, many others. To reject 
comm()n sense in order to go in search of transcendental deductions, as Kant 
does, in order to justify them, or some of them, is also to reject common sense 
itself. We must start with common sense and we must come back in the end to 
it. F. H. Bradley's pleasantry is apropos here: ''Philosophy is a finding of ibad 
reasons for what every ordinary person believes on instinct". Bradley thereby 
proclailns himself, despite all appearances to the contrary , to understand this 
reality. Philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom , is at the same time a pursuit of the 
fundamental common sense about the conduct of life, not for ourselves, as 
individuals, only for everyone else that concerns us .  And that is that. 
S.  The Questions of De Facto Versus Normative Agreement 
Frankena tells us that the concern of ethics is concern not with de facto but 
normative agreements, both linguistically and morally. And he goes so far as to 
claim this both historically and across cultures everywhere. His contention, in 
short, is that he is not concerned with how we in fact do use the language: of 
morals but only with the question how we ought to use it. In short, he means to 
tell us that philosophers ought to be concerned only with questions about how 
we ought to talk about right and <vrong or what we ought to do. How is this 
possible? How in the world can he go about accomplishing such an end? To my 
mind, the very project seems ridiculous. 
All the same, Frankena's disputes with me, as well as with other philosophers 
including Moore, have always been disagreements which assumed that we were at 
least talking about the ordinary uses or meanings of such words as "good", 
"right", and "ought". His dispute with Moore in "The Naturalistic Fallacy" 
concerns the possibility of defining "good" in at least one of its ordinary senses. 
Only recently has he switched, and I do not fully understand why. Of course, 
there is some normative element in all employments of words. That is why we 
have dictionaries. But we assume that, most of the time, most of us understand 
one another. And this we cannot do unless we speak a common tongue which we 
use in the same way and take for granted that we are, for the time being, usmg 
correctly. 
This issue, by the way. has nothing whatever to do with Malcolm's old 
contention that ordinary language is correct language (following Moore). I ,  for 
my part, want no part of such a thesis. Ordinary language, to be sure, �s our 
mother tongue, and we learn more specialized languages and expressions only by 
stages, as we need to do so. But the language of the calculus, although a 
specialized language which not everyone knows or cares to learn, is a very 
common ordinary language. The same is true of many words. ,Let me give an 
example or two. "Carnadine" is not a very ordinary word, though you will find 
it in the dictionary. It is a rather special word, used by Shakespeare for a rather 
special purpose in a play, and very few uninstructed persons understand it. The 
same is true of "labyrinthine" and many others. But the point is plain. 
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The question of substantive ethical agreement as well as ethical disagreement 
is our central concern. Frankena does seem to think that there is, or should be, 
fundamental agreement about basic ethical principles. And he does hold that this 
is true, not only historically but across all cultures from east to west and from 
north to south. I shall simply put this question to him: How does he know? 
Indeed, how can he know? Even if he is right, I cannot see that he has shown in 
the least that everyone, really, subscribes to something called "true morality", as 
he. calls it. The ordinary langauge of morals, and the ordinary uses of ethical 
terms, varies enormously. And it has evolved historically. Let me give one or two 
examples. Take the word "virtue". ''Virtue" was a common term, well 
understood .. by the. Greeks and the topic of many of Hume's discussions in the 
Treatise. Hume is centrally concerned, as we know, with the important 
distinction between the ''natural virtues" and the "artificial virtues". Was he 
talking about an "excellence" as the Greeks were? I doubt it . Or, rather, he was 
not talking about excellences \as we ordinarily understand them in applying 
them, as we do, to common household applicances. Indeed, the very term 
"virtuous" seems slightly idiotic as in Sir Toby Pelche's taunting question to 
Malvolio in Twelfth Night when he says, "Dost thou think, Malvolio that 
because thou art virtuous, there shall be no more cakes and ale?" Virtue, indeed. 
I am not against virtue, mind you. I am only saying that ordinary people in our 
time are rather dismayed by the question whether a man or woman is virtuous. 
Usually they have sex in mind. An adulterer, in the tninds of some, is not 
virtuous. Why? Not because he is without excellence or a decent person. He is 
not virtuous because he declines to observe certain customs which a great many 
people consider to be outmoded. 
One must conclude then, that there is little, if any, agreement whether 
linguistic or non-linguistic, whether historical or cross-cultural, whether factual 
or normative about the moral point of view, taken as a representation of 
something called "true morality". This will have to do, for the time being, as our 
discussion of the epistemological problems that have concerned us in this 
section. 
VI. CONCERNING THE OPEN QUESTION 
Frankena says in ''The Principles of Morality" that my writings in ethics may 
be construed, in effect, as one prolonged brooding upon the "open question 
argument". But, as I have said before, I do not raise it in Moore's form. Like 
Prichard, I am concerned less with the question about the meaning of good, and 
more with those which have to do with the questions about the meaning of right 
and, more particularly, ought and its close cognates, obliged and obligation. In a 
certain way it does no� appear to me to matter whether·the question "But is it 
good?" can be closed in the case of good, for good is a weasel word, if ever there 
was one. Moreover, so far as morals are concerned, "right" and "ought" are the 
fundamental terms to be reckoned with . Now, however, let me say something about how I take the drift of the open 
question argument. Of course it is not proof that ethical terms are indefinable. I, 
like most persons of common sense, have a use for the term "synonymous". 
Unlike Quine and others, I have not since my youth, ever supposed that it could 
be demonstrated that two terms are ever exactly synonymous, at least in 
ordinary languages. Synonymy is a matter of degree: some terms are closely 
synonymous, others less so. The point does not need laboring here. The open 
question argument, once for all, is not a proof in any strict sense and I have 
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never claimed it to be one. The open question should be viewed in the manner of 
an unclosed induction. Let us give one or two examples. One can always ask 
whether one ought to keep a promise, or whether he ought to pay his debts, or 
do justice, in any form, to another. And, of course, one can always reply "Yes, 
certainly , he ought to do so". My point is simply that, while the open question 
proves nothing, �t has a good deal of plausibility when understood as an 
induction. Whenever one stops askirig the open question , because he is tired of 
raising it for the time being, he can always go on raising it, from case to case, 
when his spirits revive. Thus, so far as I can see, the open question has great 
inductive force, and it is only as an induction that I 'care to raise it about an)l 
term whatever. 
In tltis form, it seems to me, contrary to Frankena, to have immense power, I 
no longer simply brood over it. I believe it and use it and will use it throughout 
this paper, as a fairly conclusive argument against the moral point of view in all 
forms whatever. I also have used it elsewhere, against such illusions as the 
religious point of view, the scientific point of view, the political and legal points 
of view, indeed, against any point of view which is called "the X point of view". 
I can best make the point in this way: there is no such thing as "the obligatory 
view". There are obligations and duties, of course. But there is nothing tha( 
answers to the phrase "the obligatory point of view". So for the time being, I 
decline, once for all, to brood over the point of view, in any shape or form at all. 
VII. CONCERNING INSTITUTIONS 
In. the opening sentences of Frankena's "The Principles of Morality", we find 
this sentence: "We often speak of morality as a human or social enterprise or 
institution more or less coordinat.e with art, education, law and science -- for 
example, when we ask how morality is related to law or to religion, or when we 
talk about the moral sphere as contrasted with the legal o r  �cientific ones." 
Anyone would be a fool, of course, if he denied that there are institutions, and it 
fa no part of my purpose to argue with Frankena over this. What I do argue is 
that there is any such institution as JM institution of science, which some may 
consider to have the best claim, in this age of institutionalized science when most 
· - --- ' scientists are simply "organization men", to be regarded as something that 
answers to the phrase "the institution of science". But I think that all activities 
in science, whether physical or social, are open-ended institutions and I believe 
that most reflective scientists would agree with me. But I shall stick here to 
something called "the institution of art". Now, of course, there is a great deal of 
institutionalized art. No doubt about that. But art is not an institution at all. Is 
music, or poetry, or painting, or sculpture an institution? Even to raise such a 
question seems ridiculous on the face of it. Do Mozart and Berg belong to 
something called the institution of music? Do Donatello and Henry Moore 
belong to the institution of sculpture? Such questions, I think, are idiotic. 
Perhaps Frankena might reply that I am taking him too literally. He also uses the 
term "enterprise" as more or less equivalent in meaning to "institution ". But I 
cannot think of a single entity on earth that corresponds to the phrase "the 
enterprise of X". 
Institutions, a!( T contend, are very open ended. They evorvc, sometimes in 
such revolutionary ways that it is difficult or impossible to recognize them as 
having any institutional connections with one another whatever. Did Galileo 
belong to, or conceive himself as belonging to, an institution of physics? The 
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question answers itself. 
Let us not belabor the point any longer. Institutions and enterprises can no 
longer be firmly distinguished from one another. Science blurs into art, 
education blurs into government, morality into religion . And so on into the 
night. Hence, I say without hesitation that there is no such thing as the 
institution o f  morality as distinct from that of religion or science or art. 
Frankena and his allies gain nothing and lose much by claiming that the moral 
point of view represents an institution. Instead of strengthening their case, they 
weaken it  drastically by accepting it, even if only by analogy. So that will have 
to do about the question whether morality is an institution distinct from all 
others. 
VIII. THE PRESSURES OF MORAL DOUBT 
Now we come close to the heart of our problems concerning the moral point 
of view. And I shall need to quote Frankena in extensio in order to make this 
point of view as clear as possible. 
Frankena says thls: "I am holding that when a person says, 'Morality requires 
P', he means by 'morality' true ·morality i·n the sense of 'the action-guide that 
fulfills the conditions for being a moral one and is rationally justified from the 
moral point of view, or 'the moral action-guide to which all those who are fully 
rational will eventually agree'. And he is in some way implying that he is both 
taking the moral point of view and subscribing to P. He is, however, not saying 
or implying that he actually subscribes to the true morality, since he may not 
know what this is (he claims that p belongs to it, but he does not know that it 
does). Yet he is not speaking as an outsider or spectator either, one who is not 
subsclibing to any moral action-guide, but only to come to some belief or fact 
about himself or the society around him. He subscribes to true morality in intent 
or promise, just as in doing science one subscribes in intent or promise to the 
findings of science, whatever they turn out to be, or much as Socrates subscribed 
to the 'laws' of Athens, whatever they might turn out to be, by the mere fact of 
this remaining there. In this sense, 'the principles of morality' are something to 
be discovered (or possibly 'revealed') not something to be created, invented, or 
decided on by a sheer act of 'decision' or 'commitment' on one's own part as so 
many seem to think nowadays. Thus 1· rejected the notion that when one refers 
to · 'the principles of morality' one is simply referring to principles that one 
accepts as basic or proposes to adopt by so}Tie kind of fiat, though I do want to 
say that when one uses such phrases, one is then and there subscribing to the 
principle one refers to." 
Frankena's statement, as usual, is carefully worded and well guarded against 
obvious criticisms. Here we may mainly confine our attention to his example 
about Socrates subscribing to the "laws" of Athens, whatever they might turn 
out to be, by the mere fact of him remaining there. This strikes me as incredible. 
As a kind of myth it is of great interest, but .as the representation of someone 
who takes the moral point of view, such as Frankena himself, I simply cannot 
believe it. It is like buying a pig in a poke. Just imagine what the real Socrates 
would have done had the laws of Athens prescribed that he should die by taking 
hemlock, despite the alternative of exile, which was available to him! Or, rather, 
imagine what he would have done had the laws of Athens prescribed that every 
male should cut off his testicles, or that every eldest son should be strangled at 
hirth. I swear that he would not have subscribed to, let alone obey, such 
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dreadful laws. I am morally certain, and I mean morally certain, that he would 
have done his best to change such hideous laws, or else that he would have gone 
into exile voluntarily. It is really incredible to me that Frankena could use such 
an example, or suppose that it might support, let alone embody, the moral point 
of view. 
Unfortunately, we cannot quite let it go at that, although I shoutd like to do 
so. He says that those who subscribe to true morality meet the criteria for being 
moral and are rationally justified from the moral point of view. But what � 
those criteria? He has indeed mentioned a number of them, as we know, but he 
has not shown that they are necessary and sufficient, that they do not meet 
individually or collectively the open question arguement and, above all, he does 
not show that they do not conflict, at least in the case of justice and 
benevolence. I cannot believe that he means what he says. But let us go on. And 
here is tt.e kicker. Franken a says that anyone is not saying or implying that he 
actuaily subscribes to the true morality, since he may not know what it is. Well, 
what in the name of God is he actually subscribing to? I cannot answer this 
question and I see no answer to it in the passage which we have been discussing 
or anywhere else in the whole body of his writings. So I must conclude that the 
passage is either a tissue of inconsistencies or that Frankena shnply does not 
realize what he is saying. 
Let me go a few steps further. The Socratic fatih in true morality is 
meaningless, I think, because it is totally deprived, according to the account 
given, of any knowledge whatever of the fundamental principles of true 
morality. And a faith in a set of basic action guides which are not, by 
hypothesis, known to be true as well as necessary and sufficient. This is a faith 
without any object whatever. Worse, it is a faith which would lead anyone to 
despair. In fact, I am reminded here of the despair of Soren Kierkegaard who did 
take a leap in the dark toward an eternal happiness about which he could say 
virtually nothing. There simply can be no faith without some knowledge. Or, 
rather, a faith that is based on no knowledge whatever is an irrational faith and 
not merely a form or anti-rationalism. I myself am an anti-rationalist, but with 
irrationalism 1 want nothing whatever to 40. And I am sure that this· is no less 
true of Hume1 and many others that we need not name her.e. 
IX. C.S. PEIRCE'S EXAMPLE OF A GREAT COMMUNITY 
It strikes me that there is a very close example between Frankena's faith in 
tl];e true morality, the principles of morals, or the moral point of view, and C. S. 
Peirce's and Josiah Royce's conception of the great community . 
Now Peirce holds that inquiry , which answers, as he puts it, to "the irritation 
of doubt", naturally results and has generally resulted in the past, in 
disagreement. And this is true, not only in science, bu� in ethics and in every 
other form of inquiry. But in the fullness of tiJJle, so he thinks, there will be a 
unification, or convergence. of opinion on the part of all conscientious inquirers 
on all subjects of importance, and especially oa all fundamental principles. uln 
the fullness of ti�e". What does this mean? I think it means nothing at all, 
especially from a pragmatic point of view, such as Peirce's. As someone said 
jokingly , "in the fullness of time we will all be dead". But this goes merely to 
show that we can do nothing with such a notion, can make nothing of it, 
practically speaking. How, conceivably 1 could such guide the concrete inquiries 
of scientists? The question answers its�lf. It could noL Is there any 
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methodological principles of science, or of any other discipline that employs it 
in any serious way? If there is, I have never heard of it. Peirce is here making a 
leap of faith at least as paradoxical and absurd as that advocated by Kierkegaard 
or Nietzsche, or any other existentialist known to me. I do not say that such a 
leap of faith is, in some remote sense, meaningless. What I do contend is that it is 
so paradoxical and so ab-surd that I, for one, can make nothing of it.  
As in the case of Socrates, I cannot understand anyone who can commit 
himself by an act of faith which is not based securely upon knowledge . There 
ca·n be no inquiry without faith, but there also can be no faith without 
knowledge. But they are also locked indissolubly in any other form of inquiry. 
We may hope, by stages, to reach general agreement about this theory or that. 
But we must always pause before going on and reconsider, take second thought, 
and general .agreement does not amount to universal or total agreement. 
So we must conclude, I contend, that the example of something called the 
great community in which all inquiries finally reach agreemen t in the fulness of 
time is, pragmatically, meaningless. It is of no help whatever to those who 
defend the moral point of view. On the contrary, it merely serves to underline its 
own vacuousness. 
X. THE FINAL PARADOX 
Those who, like Frankena, are exponents of the moral point of view must 
hold that there are necessary and sufficient conditions, or principles, of the 
institution or activity of morality. But, short of the fullness of time, they can 
never supply them, ft.illy and definitively. The whole notion o.f the moral point 
of view reminds me of Kant's conceptions of "ideas of reason". Such ideas, he 
teaches, invariably. lead us in to paradox. They are bare "ideas" not forms of 
knowledge. Kant is, certainly, reluctant to give up the argument from design for 
the existence of God, but he does believe also that the argument depends upon 
the causal argument and that, in turn, upon the ontological. This is not the space 
to discuss the proofs for the e�istence of God, though I myself do think that 
they can make sense of a sort, if we do not take them as more then suggestions 
of our notions of what a God .of the monotheistic sort m ight be like, at least by 
analogy. But the analogies are always weak and, in the end, can be usefully 
employed, even by a monotheist, only as intimations. · · 
My conclusion, therefore, must be that the hard rationalism that governs the 
thought of Frankena and others, invariably leads to skepticism. or wor5e. 
The doctrine of the moral point of view then , cannot, as we have tried to 
show, withstand the press·u·res of moral doubt. It has just the reverse effect upon 
a careful thinker that those who defend the moral point of view intend. And this 
is humanly, and not merely philosophically, a calamity and a tragedy. It sets us 
chasing butterflies, wills of the wisp. It is, indeed, a human and philosophic 
nightmare which, when we awake, leaves us prostrate. ·so I must say then: give 
up the search for the moral point of view and the principles of morals. Give 
them up for the sake of your own conduct of life. Be a finitist, a pluralist. 
Retain your faith that there is such a thing as the principle of moral objectivity. 
There are only principles of objectivity , of serious second thought, and they do 
not add up to any one· principle which can be called lhe principle of objectivity. 
For there is. no such principle. � 
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XI. CONCLUSIONS 
It is time that I try to state explicitly my own general conclusions about our 
subject. 
First; let us adopt what may be called a principle of modesty. By this I mean 
that we should be more, far more modest about our claims about moral 
principles or precepts than those who defend the .. moral point of view have bee.n. 
They are, and are intended. to serve as action guides. I certainly agree with 
Frankena about this, though neither of us can claim any originality on this score. 
From the time of Aristotle on, as we have seen, most of the great moral 
philosophers have always regarded moral principles as guides to action. Hume 
did so, and so did Kant and the rest. 
Secondly, so I contend, let us accept a principle of diversity or plurality in 
ethics and elsewhere. Ph.iralsim is not incompatible with objectivism, in ethics as 
elsewhere. Let us, in fact, adopt something like what Peirce himself called 
critic�! common sense. Critical common sense, to·be sure. Common sense, when 
unwll$hed, is only a starting point. But common sense is always subject to 
piece-meal critique. And such criticis"ms of common sense-must be made in the 
name of common sense, and .they must attempt to guide common sense. to 
something better, more refined, more sens�ble. But they must do so in the name 
of common sense. Peirce, as we have seen , departed radically from common 
sense, and also from critical common sense, when he adopted the empty notion 
of the great community. There is, from a common sense point of view, no 
definitive concluding result to be reached or hoped for. Revision is endless. And 
that is all that I have. to say on this prindple of critical common sense or critical common sensism. 
We should, to be sure, accept a principle of objectivity, in morals, as 
elsewhere. Moral principles, like all "Others, are ·corrigible principles that, in the 
light of expe·rience� have proved better warranted than ·others. We should, all the 
same, give up the notio·n th.at there is any single ·Jine of justification �n ethics, 
religion , or science; Ther� are many forms of Justification, and there are · times 
where the demand ·for further justifications gets us nowhere. Let us not fall into 
the really dispiriting trap of trying to prove, definitively , what everybody-tends 
to believe on instinct. The right to believe, in fact, is a right simply to tend to 
believe, and to imptove ·our beliefs, piece by piece. Above· all, we should 
renounce absolutely definitive first principles of any sort. No principle is 
definitive and we waste our human and philosophical resources in searching· for 
definitive principles. · 
Now let me say:a last word or two about truth. Here also I should propose a 
principle of objective pluralism in regard to truth and its cognates. Here, my 
leader is not Hume, but James. Truth is truth, no doubt. But this tells us 
nothing. Or nothing more than say, business is business, or honesty is as honesty 
does. There is ho definitive principle, or definition of truth.' Fundamentally this 
concept should be understood pragmatically ; in both senses of the term. To say 
that X is true is 'indeed equivalent to saying X; The point is that the "is true" 
clause · is merely reemphatic; it adds nothing, semantically, to the. statement 
itself . 
. But · this is not all. Truth is not th� same thing, and does not answer the same 
criteria in every sphere. In science; it:answers to one non-definitive set o.f criteria 
in science, te another in ethics, -aJYd ·another in religion. There is no such thing, 
·so to say, as the truth p-0in.t of vfew."-What. counts for :truth in science, does not 
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definitively count for truth in ethics, and what counts for truth in science and 
ethics does not count for truth in religion and so on. We conduct our lives in 
many ways, within many. interacting institutions and fonns of activity. And they 
may, on occasion, conflict with one another. This fact, for fact it surely is, must 
� be forgotten. I am certainly no Hegelian, though I have learned from Hegel 
a great deal and owe much to him. But his dialectic is not in the least a definitive 
principle of dialectics, nor can it be called� dialectical point of view or the 
principle of dialectics. There are many ways of thinking dialectical , and Hegel's 
way is only one. And some activities have no telos or end at all. As Kant himself, 
that radical exponent of the moral point of view, has taught us in his Gritique of 
Aesthetic Judgment, the conception of creation or creativity, whether taken 
religiously or artistically , or both, there are thin� we do which have no end or 
purpose at  all. They are purposive, but not purposeful. They are known for what 
they are, and are pronounced good only after they are finished. Any little idea 
that may start us off in the writing of a story or a poem must never be confused 
with what the creator brings off. 
An analogous point is made by Plato in his words about eros. Eros, as distinct 
from a techne, or (in his sense) art,_ has no end whatever. it is the �gy, or love, 
which energizes any art, supports it, gives it reality, as a way of doing something. 
Eros is, thus, a principle of creativity, and is scarcely more than another name 
for it. It is, that is to say, purposive but not purposeful. And there we must now 
leave the problem of truth and the truth point of view, as I have called it. 
Lastly, we must not assume that there is such a thing as. the principle of 
harmony, or consistency, or composibility, all of which, by the way, we should 
have included among the necessary and sufficient conditions of the moral point 
of view as Frankena conceives it. Does harmony take precedence over conflict? 
Yes and no. Eternal conflict in any sphere would be disastrous, and suicidal to us 
all. And the ·same, of course, is true of violence . We yearn for harmony, just as 
we yearn for peace, for which it may be regarded here as just another name. But 
not at any price. And conflict, i:n ethics as elsewhere, is the mother of invention, 
or rather, creation. We are, as human beings, progressive beings, or should try to 
be, as Mill pointed out. But progress comes about frequently as a result of 
conflict, paradox, and their overcoming. So we must accept, as finite beings, the 
fact that there is no one principle of harmony or peace, which is the highest: of 
all. 
What is the upshot of this essay? Well, I think it can be given a label if one is 
wanted, as I have s.aid. I call it "object)ve pluralism" though "objective 
relativism" would do, if  the terms relative and relativistic had not been so 
damnably pejorated. What does this come to? It comes, in closing, to the 
philosophy that there are points of view, and frequently good ones, in nearly 
every sphere. But there is nothing that answers to the phrase "the point of. 
view" . There we have it. Our thinking, whether as phitosophers, who love 
wisdom, should be endlessly pluralistic. It should proceed, in most situations in a 
piecemeal, precedential manner. This does not mean that we should proceed 
timidly or make too much of modesty . For sometimes we must resort to 
revolution, politically and also scientifically. But few of us are geniu�s. And we 
do best, in most cases, to follow the example of the common law, and abjure 
something that might be called the revolutionary point of v1ew. That would 
indeed be a disaster. We must try to be reasonably open minded and ope.n ended, 
in all of our activities. In sum, open minded we should be, but not too open-: 
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Common sense forbids open mindedness when erected into a first principle, or 
the first principle of study or inquiry. We should search for criteria, but never 
fall in love with them. We should be ready to revise, to revamp, to restate, and to 
reinquire again and again. 
There is one further position that needs more discussion before we concJude 
this essay on the moral point of view. In Section VI. of "The Principles. of 
Morality", Frankena considers an "eighth" position which, from his perspectives 
oh morality, seems to count against the doctrine which he preaches. This is the 
view that the principles of morals P is a practice of morality because it is 
commanded by God. 
As· he says, those who hold · what he calls a voluntaristic conception of the 
relationship between God and the principles of morals argue that the latter are 
such because God commands us to obey them. And those who hold that God 
commands them because He takes the moral point of view, he calls 
"intellectualists". It is obvious that Fr.ankena thinks that voluntarism is 
incompative with the purity and perfection and distinctness of the moral point 
of view. He therefore argues, a bit abruptly as it seems to me, for 
"intellectualism". That is to say, it is correct to say that God commands us to 
follow the moral point of view because it is, independently, known to be what it 
is. And, correspondingly, it is radically mistaken to take the opposing view. 
Right is right, and that's that, God or no God. . 
What shall we say about this contention? Well, it is plain from what has 
already been said that it strikes me as idiotic. I have argued at length that there is 
no such thing as the institution of morality and. no such thing as the institution 
of religion, .and that if we take the view of the religious mood as, at bottom, 
merely the sense of the prese,nce of the holy is scarcely 111ore than an 
augmentation of the sense of the ethical (though to be sure it is not so 
confmed), and the ethical hardly more than a diminuity of somewhat 
diminished, or less emphatic sense of the religious. The older I get, the less do I 
care to make sharp distinctions .which Frankena and his allies, seem to think 
necessary to protect the moral point of view's uniqueness. Kant, of course, ma.de 
a great to-do about the disti.nction between a good and a holy will, and Frankena 
is merely following Kant in this regard. 
But this is not all. For Frankena, whether or not he is still a practiciing 
Calvinist (which I have never asked him), still takes a Calvinistic view of God. 
God is a commander; He is a bloke who gives orders to "His people". I find 
Calvinism, in this. respect, at least religiously repulsive. More, I fmd it idolatrous. 
I know, to be sure, that some Calvinists take the term "commandment" to be 
merely figurative, and for all I know, so does Frankena. But he does not say so, 
and his· conception, as stated, is that God is, in the first instance anyway, a great 
law-giver. Accordingly, he is committed, by his words, to think that religion is 
primarily ethical in its inte:ntion, and that true religion is directed mainly to the 
support of ethics. 
To my mind, it is the myth of creation which is the sublime thing in the 
Torah, not the Ten Commandments. The myth of creation is not idolatrous;just 
1fte ·�ontrary. But the myth of God as the essential giver of the law is, as I haye 
said, idolatrous. When He pronounced the world "good" on the Sabbath !Day, 
He meant the whole· of it, not just the sense of right and wrong (which, of 
course·, is not mentioned in the firs't part of Genesis). As Frankena well knows, 
He meant that' the beautifut if holy, and· in faat· the whole life of the mind, 
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whethe� human or divine. What is not, or cannot be holy, even though, as we 
know, people can and do worship false gods. The sense of the holy may be 
misdirected, in the same sense that the dutiful may be. 
But there is still another aspect of the matter which I discussed in my essay 
on "The Concept of Moral Objectivity". This concerns the question whether we 
should hold that morality itself is autonomous or, rather, that moral agents 
should be so regarded. And I took the view then, as I still do, that I want 
nothing to do with the doctrine of the autonomy of morals, precisely because 
(although I did not there put it in just this way) a defense of the autonomy of 
morals is merely another defense of the uniqueness of tl).e moral point of view, 
which at this late date, requires no further criticism from me. 
The doctrine of the autonomy of morality, which is merely another way of 
talking about the uniqueness of the principle(s) of morals, as I have just said, 
simply will not do. Moreover, it is, in my opinion, though I shall not pause to 
argue the matter now, really inconsistent with the conception of a morally free 
will. 
Am I defending "voluntarism" then? The answer is ·"No.!" Religious 
voluntarism won't do, and for the reasons that I have already given. 
One concluding word on the matter that divides Frankena's views both about 
religion and ethics needs mention. From what I have said, it is plain that I cannot 
possibly be a voluntarist becau_se I do not care a rap about the existence of God, 
as He is viewed by most monotheists. Here, I may take a leaf out of Hilary 
Putnam's hilarious story about the hunter who goes out shooting· chicken parts 
and then going home and stitching them togethec so that he can have a roast 
chicken. Frankly, it is the parts that concern me and I don't much care how, or 
whether they are stiched together to make one great capon, or very much about 
how it is roasted, though I don't Jike chicken rare and I don't like it burned to 
death. Why should we worry too much about the unity or, for that matter, the 
trinity of Divine · Being? I am not sure that we should care much, not only 
whether we are polytheists, or monists. I like the Catholic erection of Mary into 
the position of such eminence that it seems at times that Catholicism, at least in 
the eyes of some of its members, is a kind of quadrinity. In fact, as I said once 
before, in my introduction to my edition to Hume's Dialogues, I share his 
sympathy with polytheism, as long as it is not taken too seriously which, so far 
as I can see, the Greek polytheists did not. I prefer it to monotheism. But it is 
really theism that I wish to repudiate. God, or at any rate, the word "God", as 
commonly understood, is dead. And let Hirn, or it, stay dead. It is the sense of 
Divine Being, and its presence that matters from my religious point of view. 
A final word about Jonathan Edwards, whose work on the Freedom of the 
Will Frankena once edited. Some of my readers may recall Edwards' lovely. 
notion of the "consent to being". I am not learned about Edwards' works, 
although I do consider him a most impressive, as well as beautiful w.riter. Nor do 
I in the least know whether or not Edwards meant to advocate the consent to 
being as such and/or the consent to all things. If he did mean this, then he, too, 
is mistaken in much the same way that St. Augustine was. For then he is 
plagued, as Augustine was, by the haunting question: "When· then is evil?" No, I 
do not consent to being as such; nor do I consent to all being. But if Edwards 
meant, simply to say, consent to Divine Being, then I am his man. But notice 
that Edwards does not say consent te The Being, nnly consent to being. So 
consent to the being, even if we call it the Divine Being, won't do. For to talk of 
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the Divine Being is theism all over again and, as I have said, theism is, or should 
be, dead, from any religious point of view with which I should care to lbe 
associated. 
Is Judaism, when all is said and done, theistic, not to say , monotheistic? I 
thin� not. For Judaism teUs us that we should not even pronounce the name of 
the holy of holies. And I would agree, but for one thing. The phrase "the holy of 
holies" is a trap of the sort which I want destroyed, once and for all. Anyway, I 
have i:iothing more to say about this aspect of the subject. The quarrel between 
religious intellectualism and religious voluntarism is a foolish quar'rel both from a 
religious and from a moral point of view. And I want no part of H. But enough is 
enough. 
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